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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GRAYCE HURD, Personal ] 
Representative of the Estate 
of Lloyd I. Hurd, Deceased ] 
and GRAYCE HURD, Personally, ] 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, ] 
vs. ] 
LEWELLYN J. SHERMAN and ] 
CONNIE SHERMAN, ] 
Defendants/Appellants. ] 
Court of Appeals No. 970202CA 
Civil No: 940600001 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS 
I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1996) and §78-2a-3(2)(j), and pursuant to 
Utah R. App. P. 3. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether plaintiff, Grayce Hurd, as personal 
representative of the Estate of Lloyd Hurd, can bring and 
maintain an action against the defendants, and whether the Estate 
of Lloyd Hurd itself can bring and maintain an action against the 
defendants. 
1. Standard of Review 
Correction of error standard. See Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2d 
138 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied. 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
B. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that a 
constructive trust had been created for the benefit of the 
plaintiff. See Addendum B, Conclusion of Law at f 1. 
1. Standard of Review 
"Conclusions of law [are] accord[ed] no particular 
deference, but [are] review[ed] for correctness." Scharf v. BMG 
Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) (citing Automotive 
Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 
P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah 1979) and Betenseon v. Call Auto & 
Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982)). 
C. Whether the trial court erred when it found there was 
no consideration for the quitclaim deed, the checks and the 
vehicle titles. See Addendum B, Amended Findings of Fact at 5 
25. 
1. Standard of Review 
The standard of review is whether the finding is clearly 
erroneous. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987). 
D. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that 
that all of the property should be immediately returned to the 
plaintiff. 
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1. standard of Review 
"Conclusions of law [are] accord[ed] no particular 
deference, but [are] review[ed] for correctness." Scharf v. BMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985) (citing Automotive 
Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, Inc.. 596 
P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah 1979) and Betenseon v. Call Auto & 
Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982)). 
E. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient 
to prove the plaintiffs' claims? 
1. Standard of Review 
Correction of error standard. See Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2d 
138 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this 
case. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final Judgment and Order of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court, Kane County, Kanab Department, 
State of Utah, the Honorable David L. Mower, presiding wherein 
after a trial date on April 4, 1996, the Court ordered that the 
constructive trust created by the parties was terminated, and 
that the items transferred to the defendants, either of them, as 
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constructive trustees, shall be delivered to the plaintiff within 
a ten (10) day period from the date of the Court's Order. In 
addition to the items to be transferred from the defendants to 
the plaintiff, see Addendum A (subparagraphs a-e), the trial 
court granted judgment against the defendants in the sum of 
$20,000.00 and costs. Id. 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The present appeal arises out of the conveyance of real 
property, the transfer of funds from a checking account, and the 
transfer of personal property. The plaintiffs are, Grayce Hurd 
("Grayce"), as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd 
I. Hurd ("Mr. Hurd") and Grayce, Hurd, personally, See Addendum B 
at 5 1. The defendants are Lewellyn Sherman ("Mr. Sherman") and 
Connie Sherman ("Ms. Sherman"). Id. at f 1. 
Mr. Hurd and Grayce lived together since approximately 1964, 
however, they never entered into a formal marriage contract. Id. 
at f 6. R-256, 377, 386, 392, 226, 236. No children were born 
during the course of their relationship. Id. At no time prior 
to the death or since the death of Mr. Hurd has there been any 
judicial proceeding or administrative proceeding wherein Grayce 
was declared to be the common-law wife of Mr. Hurd. R-157, 399. 
Mr. Hurd died on June 3, 1992, see Addendum B at fl 5 and, 
accordingly, the relationship between Mr. Hurd and Grayce ended. 
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Prior to Mr. Hurd's death, he met with attorney Keith 
Eddington ("Mr. Eddington"). R-357. This meeting occurred at 
the residence of Mr. Sherman, and was in response to a request 
that Mr. Eddington prepare, review, and advise Mr. Hurd on a 
Power of Attorney document. R-361, 363, 365. 
During the meeting between Mr. Hurd and Mr. Eddington, Mr. 
Hurd was advised by Mr. Eddington of what rights he would be 
relinquishing by executing the Power of Attorney. R-359, 361. 
Essentially, Mr. Hurd was informed by Mr. Eddington that if he 
executed the Power of Attorney, designating Mr. Sherman as the 
attorney-in-fact, he would be permitting Mr. Sherman to act as 
though he was Mr. Hurd. R-359, 361. 
Due to the legal significance of a Power of Attorney, Mr. 
Eddington's concern was whether Mr. Hurd understood what was 
happening, whether or not that was his wish, and whether the 
execution of the Power of Attorney was being forced upon him. R-
357. Mr. Eddington's conclusion was that the Power of Attorney 
was not being forced upon Mr. Hurd, and that he understood what 
was going on. R-357, 361. In fact, Mr. Eddington testified that 
Mr. Hurd made it clear that it was his wish to execute the Power 
of Attorney; there was no hesitation on Mr. Hurd's part when he 
executed the Power of Attorney. R-361. With respect to the 
Power of Attorney, it was Mr. Hurd's desire to execute it in 
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favor of Mr. Sherman because he trusted him. R-359. Part of the 
considerations for executing the Power of Attorney in favor of 
Mr. Sherman was because Mr. Hurd wanted to see that Grayce was 
taken care of. R-365. (Power of Attorney is found at plaintiffs7 
Exhibit no. 2 3.) 
During the course of their meeting, Mr. Hurd and Mr. 
Eddington also discussed gift taxes and the ability to transfer 
$10,000.00 tax free. R-360. Mr. Hurd also inquired about what 
potential problems might arise if he transferred all of his 
property to Mr. Sherman. R-360. Mr. Eddington informed him that 
he did not know the value of his estate, however, if it was over 
$10,000.00, he could have a gift tax problem. Id. Mr. Eddington 
further informed Mr. Hurd that if he wanted to disperse it 
between the children of Grayce, he could most likely get away 
with that. Id. Mr. Hurd responded by informing Mr. Eddington 
that he did not trust the other children, but he did trust Mr. 
Sherman with Grayce. Id. 
Regarding the transfer of property, Mr. Hurd did not inform 
Mr. Eddington that he had a conversation with either Mr. Sherman 
or Ms. Sherman. R-361. With respect to being advised on money 
matters, neither defendant ever advised Mr. Hurd about these 
matters. R-389, 402, 407, 409. Mr. Sherman also neither induced 
Mr. Hurd to transfer the home into his name nor to execute the 
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Power of Attorney in his name. R-411, 415. Mr. Hurd had 
informed Lorna Guenther, his cousin (R-222), while at the V. A. 
Hospital (R-223) prior to his staying at the defendants' home and 
prior to meeting Mr. Eddington, that he was going to give Mr. 
Sherman Power of Attorney and to have his home and all property 
transferred to and to belong to Mr. Sherman. R-226-228, 230-231. 
These same statements were made to Kenneth and Deon Lamb at a 
different time at the V. A. Hospital prior to Mr. Hurd staying at 
the defendants' home that he, Mr. Hurd, was going to give his 
property and home to Mr. Sherman and give Mr. Sherman Power of 
Attorney over all his property. R-373, 375, 381-382. Kenneth 
Lamb was Mr. Hurd's cousin. R-368. 
With respect to Mr. Hurd's bank account at Zions Bank, Mr. 
Sherman was instructed by Mr. Hurd to withdraw the money and to 
transfer the money into an account in his name. R-412, 413. 
(Note: The account was sole owned and held by Mr. Hurd.) An 
additional discussion occurred regarding the transfer of the 
funds, which was that the transfer of funds were to be as gifts. 
R-412, 413. First, there was to be a $10,000.00 gift for Mr. 
Sherman and, second, there was to be a $10,000.00 gift for Ms. 
Sherman. An additional instruction from Mr. Hurd to Mr. Sherman 
was that he was to transfer the home into his name. R-415. Mr. 
Hurd attempted to explain the gift transfer of the bank monies 
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but Grayce states she didn't understand what Mr. Hurd meant. R-
400-401. 
To effectuate the conveyance of the real property, Grayce 
and Mr. Sherman signed a quitclaim deed, which said deed was 
recorded on June 2, 1992. See Addendum B 1 22. See also 
plaintiffs7 Exhibit no. 21. The grantors were Mr. Hurd and 
Grayce Hurd, husband and wife, and the grantees were Mr. Sherman 
and Ms. Sherman, as joint tenants with full rights of 
survivorship, and not as tenants in common. Mr. Sherman signed 
the quitclaim deed as the attorney-in-fact. Grayce signed the 
quitclaim deed after she and Mr. Hurd discussed signing the 
quitclaim deed, and then she signed because they (Grayce and Mr. 
Hurd) mutually agreed she sign. R-318, 321. In fact, all of the 
personal property (truck, trailer, etc.) which was signed over to 
Mr. Sherman by Grayce was done after she and Mr. Hurd talked 
about it, then mutually agreed to sign it over. R-318-321. The 
record is devoid of any evidence of any discussions or requests 
from either defendant to Grayce to transfer property held in her 
name to either defendant. 
Regarding the trial court's Findings of Fact, the Court 
found that Mr. Hurd and Grayce lived in several different cities, 
and acquired both real and personal property over the years. See 
Addendum B f 7(a). That the two had filed tax returns with the 
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IRS and the State of Utah for the calendar year of 1986, which 
said filing status indicated that they were filing as married, 
and filing jointly. Id. at fl 7(b). That on June 10, 1985, they 
received a warranty deed from Georgia Phelps in which the 
grantees were Mr. Hurd and Grayce, his wife. Id. at 5 7(c). 
That on that same date, they purchased title insurance in the 
names of Mr. Hurd and Grayce Hurd, his wife. Id. at f 7(d). 
That in June and July of 1986, they maintained a joint checking 
account with Zions First National Bank, Kanab Office. Id. at 5 
7(d). From 1984 to 1986, they maintained a joint checking 
account with Valley Bank and Trust, Granger-Hunter Office; the 
account was in the names of Mr. Lloyd Hurd and Mrs. Lloyd Hurd. 
Id. at f 7(e) . 
The trial court found on June 1, 1992, Mr. Hurd and Grayce 
owned the following items of property: 
a. A house and lot located in Kanab, Kane County, State of 
Utah, more particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest 
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" of the official 
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East 6.0 
rods, then north 108.75°; thence West 6.0 rods; thence 
South 108.75° to the point of beginning; 
b. Two shares of stock in the Kanab irrigation Company; 
c. A travel trailer, fifth-wheel type, Teton brand, 1978 
model; 
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d. A travel trailer, 18 feet long, Kit Companion brand; 
e. A 1911 Chevrolet pickup truck; 
f. A 1980 Oldsmobile automobile; 
g. A bank account at Zions First National Bank, Kanab 
Branch, account no: 052-50552-6, worth $20,420.85; and 
h. A bank account at Zions First National Bank, Kanab 
Branch, account no: 052-33638-5, worth $789.65. Id. at f 9(a). 
The trial court also found that on Friday, May 29, 1992, a 
conversation took place at Mr. Sherman's house between Mr. Hurd, 
Grayce, Mr. Sherman and Ms. Sherman. For the sake of brevity, 
the defendants incorporate those findings, see id. at J 16, 
without setting them out. With respect to the trial court's 
findings regarding the conversation, it should be noted that the 
trial court's findings are speculative, that is, the Court found 
that "[t]he conversation probably went something like this[.]n 
Id. 
The trial court further found that neither Mr. Sherman nor 
Ms. Sherman paid money or transferred anything of value to Grayce 
in exchange for the quitclaim deed, the checks, and the vehicle 
titles. Id. at \ 25. 
Finally, the trial court found that one year had passed 
since Mr. Hurd's death, and no claims had been made by Social 
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Security, the Veteran's Administration, Medicare, or any long-
term care provider. Id. at ff 33-34. 
Based on the trial court's Findings of Fact, it made three 
Conclusions of Law. First, that a constructive trust had been 
created for the benefit of Grayce. Id. at f 1. The second 
Conclusion of Law was that all of the property received in trust 
for the benefit of Grayce should be immediately returned, 
assigned and transferred to Grayce, including the following: 
a. A house and lot located in Kanab, Kane County, State of 
Utah, or particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest 
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" of the official 
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East 6.0 
rods, then north 108.75°; thence West 6.0 rods; thence 
South 108.75° to the point of beginning; 
b. Two shares of stock in the Kanab irrigation Company; 
c. A travel trailer, 5th-wheel type, Teton brand, 1978 
model; 
d. A travel trailer, 18 feet long, Kit Companion brand; 
e. A 1977 Chevrolet pickup truck; 
f. A 1980 Oldsmobile automobile; 
g. $20,000.00 taken by defendants from Zions First 
National Bank, account no: 052-50552-6. Id. at f 2. 
The final Conclusion of Law by the trial court was that 
Grayce was entitled to a judgment against Mr. Sherman and Ms. 
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Sherman in the sum of $20,000.00, together with court costs 
incurred. Id. at J 3. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The defendants argue that the plaintiff is not a real party 
in interest, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd H. 
Hurd, based upon her claim of being the surviving spouse of Mr. 
Hurd because Grayce did not, within one year, obtain either a 
judicial or administrative order establishing that she was the 
common-law wife of Mr. Hurd. Because she did not establish that 
she was the common-law wife of Mr. Hurd, she is not the real 
party in interest as the Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Lloyd H. Hurd and, accordingly, she cannot bring and maintain a 
cause of action against the defendants in that capacity. The 
defendants also argue that there is no person who can bring and 
maintain a cause of action on behalf of the Estate because no 
person satisfies the enumerated factors set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-203(1)(a-f) (1987). 
Additionally, the defendants assert the trial court erred 
when it imposed a constructive trust on the conveyed real 
property, transferred funds, and transferred personal property. 
This is because the trial did not find, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that "certain circumstances" existed before it imposed 
the constructive trust. These "certain circumstances" it should 
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have found are twofold. First, it should have the existence of a 
confidential relationship and, second, the existence of an oral 
promise to hold property. 
The defendants also argue that the trial court erred when it 
determined there was no consideration for the quitclaim deed, the 
checks and the vehicle titles. This is because in one instance, 
consideration is unnecessary. In the second instance, it also 
was unnecessary because the transfers were gifts. In the third 
instance, there was sufficient consideration. 
The defendants further argue that the trial court erred when 
it concluded that all of the previously transferred property be 
immediately returned because the property was transferred to 
create a life estate, and because any reconveyance of property 
places Grayce and Mr. Sherman in their respective positions, that 
is, tenants in common. 
Finally, the defendants assert that the evidence does not 
establish plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs alleged one cause of 
action, fraud. As previously stated, the evidence does not 
establish the existence of a confidential relationship. Without 
the evidence demonstrating the existence of a confidential 
relationship, that claim must fail. Additionally, regarding 
plaintiffs7 claim sounding in fraud, the plaintiffs failed to 
plead then prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the essential 
00004646.97 13 
elements for a claim sounding in fraud and, therefore, all claims 
of plaintiffs fail. 
VI. ARGUMENTS 
A. THE PLAINTIFF, GRAYCE HURD, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF 
THE ESTATE OF MR. HURD, CANNOT BRING AND MAINTAIN AN ACTION 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS NOR CAN ANY PERSON BRING AND MAINTAIN 
AN ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE 
Mr. Hurd and Grayce lived together since approximately 19 64, 
however, they never entered into a formal marriage contract• See 
Addendum B at f 6. Based on that relationship, plaintiff Grayce 
Hurd asserted herself as the real party in interest as the 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd because 
she was the "surviving spouse" of Mr. Hurd. R-155, 157. See 
Utah Code Ann. 75-3-203(1)(d) (Supp. 1993). Grayce's assertion 
as the real party interest, as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd, must fail. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a) states, in pertinent part, that 
"[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party 
in interest." "Under the rule, the real party in interest is the 
person entitled to enforce the right asserted under the governing 
substantive law." Certain Interested Underwriters v. Layne, 26 
F.3d 39, 42-43 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The 
defendants assert that Grayce is not entitled to enforce any 
right of the Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd, as Personal Representative 
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of that Estate, on the ground that she is not the surviving 
spouse of Mr. Hurd. 
In order for Grayce to establish the existence of a common-
law marriage between herself and Mr. Hurd and, thus, be the 
surviving spouse of Mr. Hurd, Grayce must have obtained either a 
court or administrative order declaring she was the common-law 
wife of Mr. Hurd. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(1) (1987). This 
order must have established that the common-law marriage arose 
out of a contract between two consenting parties, that is, Mr. 
Hurd and Grayce, and the order must have also established the 
enumerated factors set forth in § 30-1-4.5(a-e). And, n[t]he 
determination or establishment of a marriage . . . must [have] 
occur[ed] . . . within one year following the termination of that 
relationship." § 30-1-4.5(2). See also Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 
791, 793 (Utah 1994) ("Subsection (2) states that the court or 
administrative order must be entered 'within one year following 
the termination of that relationship.7"). Also Buach v. 
Enqlehom. 906 P.2d 918 (Utah.App. 1995). 
Mr. Hurd died on June 3, 1992, (see Addendum B at fl 5), and, 
accordingly, the relationship between Mr. Hurd and Grayce ended. 
Pursuant to § 30-1-4.5(2), Grayce had until June 3, 1993 to 
establish the existence of a common-law marriage between herself 
and Mr. Hurd. No such determination was made. Because Grayce 
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did not establish, within one year, that she was the common-law 
wife of Mr. Hurd, she cannot now act as a real party in interest, 
as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd, 
based upon her assertion that she is the surviving spouse of Mr. 
Hurd under § 75-3-203(1)(d). Therefore, Grayce, acting in the 
capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd H. 
Hurd, cannot bring and maintain an action against the defendants. 
Because Grayce is not the surviving spouse of Mr. Hurd, and 
cannot act as a Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd 
Hurd based upon her surviving spouse claim, and there having been 
no person duly appointed as a Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd who meets one of the requirements set 
forth in § 75-3-203(1)(a-f), there is no person who is a real 
party in interest who can bring and maintain an action on behalf 
of the Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd against the defendants. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST HAD BEEN CREATED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFF 
"A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent 
unjust enrichment in the absence of any express or implied 
intention to form a trust." Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1117, 
1179 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Matter of Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 
1111 (Utah 1982)). And, "under certain circumstances that equity 
will impress a constructive trust upon property." Nielson v. 
Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 511, 513 (Utah 1976). These certain 
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circumstances must be found to exist "by clear and convincing 
evidence." Id. (citing Jewell v. Horner. 366 P.2d 594 (Utah 
1961) and Chambers v. Emery, 45 P. 192 (Utah 1896)). However, 
before a constructive trust will be impressed upon property, 
there must be a finding of the existence of a confidential 
relationship, see id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 
Sec. 45(b) (1959)). See also Ashton, 733 P.2d at 151 ("The 
transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential 
relationship to the transferor.") (quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts § 45(b) (1957)). 
In order to find the existence of a confidential 
relationship, it is insufficient to find a "relationship based 
upon sincere affection, confidence, and trust . . . [because] 
such characteristics alone do not establish a confidential 
relationship in it legal sense." Mattes, 759 P.2d at 1179 
(citing Blodaett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) and 
Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 710 (Utah 1965)) (ellipsis 
inserted) (bracket inserted). Instead, lf[t]he doctrine of 
confidential relationship rests upon the principle of inequality 
between the parties, and implies a position of superiority 
occupied by one of the parties over the other[.]" id (citing 
Webster v. Lehmerf 742 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
Bradbury, 401 P.2d at 713)) (other citations omitted). 
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The defendants herein assert that before the trial court 
could impose a constructive trust on the conveyed real property, 
the transfer of funds as gifts, and the transfer of personal 
property, it should have found, first, that a confidential 
relationship existed between Mr. Sherman and Mr. Lloyd and, 
second, it should have found there was an oral promise by Mr. 
Sherman to Mr. Hurd to hold property. 
These "certain circumstances" must exist as to Mr. Hurd and 
Mr. Sherman because Mr. Hurd executed a Power of Attorney 
designating Mr. Sherman as the attorney-in-fact,(R-359) and it 
was through this status Mr. Sherman signed the quitclaim deed as 
Mr. Hurd, which conveyed the real property, see Addendum B at J 
22; and it was through this status that Mr. Sherman transferred 
the funds from Mr. Hurd/s personal account as gifts to himself 
and Ms. Sherman. R-413. As to the transfer of vehicle titles, 
there must also be a showing of a confidential relationship 
between Mr. Hurd and Mr. Sherman because Mr. Hurd and Grayce had 
discussions concerning the transfer of those titles and, 
therefore, there should have been a finding that Mr. Sherman 
occupied a position of superiority over Mr. Hurd which caused Mr. 
Hurd to discuss the transfer of the vehicle titles with Grayce 
whereby Mr. Hurd could convince Grayce to transfer those titles. 
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With respect to the existence of a confidential relationship 
between Mr. Hurd and Mr. Sherman, the trial court made no such 
finding. See Addendum B. Moreover, the record is devoid of 
evidence of a clear and convincing nature which would establish 
the existence of a confidential relationship between Mr. Hurd and 
Mr. Sherman. 
For instance, during direct examination, Mr. Kenneth Lamb 
when asked if there were any directives given by Mr. Sherman to 
transfer the property testified as follows: "No. Lloyd done that 
his self. Lloyd wanted that, that's the way Lloyd wanted it. He 
was his own mind until he died." R-375:10-11. Similarly, Mrs. 
Lamb testified that Mr. Hurd had his own mind, his own thoughts. 
Id. at 381. She also testified that he was not easily induced 
into doing things by others, and that he was kind of stubborn. 
Id. It is apparent from the Lambs testimony that Mr. Hurd was a 
head-strong, independent and stubborn individual. According to 
the Lambs testimony, it is very unlikely that Mr. Sherman 
occupied a position of dominance over Mr. Hurd. 
Additionally, Mr. Eddington's conclusion was that the Power 
of Attorney was not being forced upon Mr. Hurd, Id at 359:13, 
but, rather, it was Mr. Hurd's desire to execute the Power of 
Attorney. Id. at 361:25. This was evident because there was no 
hesitation on Mr. Hurd's part when he signed the Power of 
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Attorney. Id. at line 24. Therefore, according to Mr. 
Eddington's testimony, Mr. Sherman could not have occupied a 
position of dominance over Mr. Hurd because it was Mr. Hurd's 
desire to sign the Power of Attorney. 
Finally, plaintiffs' own testimony refutes any claim of a 
confidential relationship between Mr. Hurd and Mr. Sherman. This 
is because Grayce and Mr. Hurd discussed signing the quitclaim 
deed, and then they both came to a mutual agreement regarding the 
signing of the quitclaim deed based upon their discussions. Id. 
at 318. In fact, with respect to the transfer of personal 
property, Grayce and Mr. Hurd discussed the transfers, and then 
both mutually agreed on the transfers based upon their 
discussions. Id. at 318-319. Accordingly, plaintiffs' own 
testimony clearly shows no position of superiority by Mr. Sherman 
over Mr. Hurd because the decisions to transfer both real 
property and personal property were mutual agreements between 
Grayce and Mr. Hurd based upon those discussions. 
Regarding the transfer of property, the evidence 
demonstrates that Mr. Hurd transferred his interest to Mr. 
Sherman because "that is the way [he] wanted it.11 Id at 375. He 
also transferred his interest after discussing it with Grayce. 
Grayce voluntarily transferred her interest after she discussed 
the transfer with Mr. Hurd. n/In Barlow Society v. Commercial 
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Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 1986), [this Court] held, 
"Absent fraud, duress, mistake, or the like attributable to the 
grantee, a competent grantor will not be permitted to attack or 
impeach his own deed."'" Mattes, 759 p.2d at 1179. Because the 
transfer was voluntarily made by the plaintiffs, and because 
plaintiffs cannot show the existence of fraud, see infra, 
subsection D, the plaintiff cannot attack or impeach her own 
deed. 
Regarding an oral promise to hold property, the trial court 
did find there might have been such a conversation between Mr. 
Sherman to Mr. Hurd. The trial court found that the following 
conversation "probably" occurred. From Mr Sherman: "Let's do 
this: I'll keep all of the property for a year. Mom can apply 
for social security. If nobody says anything for a year, then we 
shoulcj be safe and I'll give all of th$ property back to her. In 
the meantime, she can continue living in the house. See Addendum 
B at \ 16. From Mr. Hurd: That sounds good to me, but I'm not 
dead yet." Id^ . This finding by the trial court is speculative 
because its finding notes that »(t]he conversation probably went 
something like this[.]" IdL This is speculation and conjecture 
by thQ trial court which does not satisfy the clear and 
convincing burden of proof. Nielson, 558 P.2d at 513. 
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The record is devoid of any clear and convincing evidence, 
Nielson, 558 P.2d at 513, which would demonstrate the existence 
of a confidential relationship between Mr. Hurd and Mr. Sherman. 
The record also fails to demonstrate, by the same burden of 
proof, the existence of an oral promise to hold property given by 
either defendant to Mr. Hurd or by either defendant to Grayce. 
Because the record does not establish that "certain 
circumstances" existed, by clear and convincing proof, the trial 
court erred when it imposed a constructive trust on the conveyed 
real property, the transfer of funds as gifts, and the transfer 
of personal property. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THERE WAS NO 
CONSIDERATION FOR THE QUITCLAIM DEED, THE CHECK OR THE 
VEHICLE TITLES 
The trial court found that neither Mr. Sherman nor Ms. 
Sherman paid money or transferred anything of value to Grayce in 
exchange for the quitclaim deed, the checks and the vehicle 
titles. See Addendum B at f 25. The defendants assert that the 
trial court erred in its finding. 
With respect to the quitclaim deed, fl[a]s between the 
parties a deed is good, with or without consideration." See 
Barlow Soc. v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 398, 401 (Utah 
1986) (citing Brown v. Peterson Development Co., 622 P.2d 1175 
(Utah 1980)). 
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Regarding the trial court's finding of no consideration for 
the transfer of the funds, those transfer were gifts. R-413 The 
evidence establishes this because Mr. Hurd discussed this topic 
with Mr. Eddington. Id. at 360. The testimony of Kenneth Lamb, 
Deon Lamb and Lorna Guenther specifically set forth that Mr. 
Sherman was to receive the truck, trailer and house. R-225, 229, 
230, 231, 373, 381-382. Mr. Hurd's conversation with Mr. 
Eddington was to transfer his property to Mr. Sherman and how to 
make a gift of property he owned to Mr. and Ms. Sherman and what 
the problems would be if he made the transfers. R-360. Mr. 
Eddington informed Mr. Hurd of the gift tax problems and other 
ramifications of transferring his property to Mr. Sherman. 
Grayce also testified that Mr. Hurd wanted his bank account 
monies transferred to the defendants as gifts and as gifts no 
consideration is necessary. R-4 00. (Note: Grayce's name was not 
on the bank accounts and she did not sign any documents for their 
transfer to defendants.) 
With respect to the consideration for the transfer of 
vehicle titles, the consideration was to see that Grayce was 
taken care of. Id. at 365. This has in fact occurred. 
Defendants have allowed Grayce to remain living in the home and 
even have made some repairs to the home. R-412, 416. Mr. Hurd 
did not trust Paul Sherman or Iris Meir and believed that they 
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would wrongfully "steal" the property from Grayce. Nor did Mr, 
Hurd believe Grayce should have the property. R-22 6, 227, 231, 
360, 365. This testimony is objective testimony because it came 
from objective witnesses, Mr. Eddington, Kenneth Lamb, Deon Lamb 
and Lorna Guenther. Id. The plaintiff also testified that there 
was consideration for the transfers. During examination by 
plaintiffs' counsel, plaintiff testified to the following: "Lloyd 
also talked to Lewellyn about it, and he said, I want to know 
that Grayce will be taken care of?" Thus, the trial court erred 
when it found there was no consideration for the transfer of real 
property, checks and vehicle titles. 
Further, the plaintiffs failed to allege in their complaint 
any constructive trust and never moved to modify their complaint 
to assert a claim of constructive trust. The defendants at the 
close of plaintiffs7 case moved to dismiss the action in part on 
the failure to plead, allege or move the court to request a 
constructive trust. R-347. This was again raised in closing 
argument. R-434. The plaintiffs' claim of fraud was an "all or 
nothing" type of claim. Grayce didn't want a life estate in the 
property. She wanted all of the property or nothing. This is 
why she alleged fraud as the basis of her complaint. 
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D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT ALL THE 
PROPERTY SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY RETURNED 
The trial court concluded that the following should be 
returned to Grayce immediately: 
a. A house and lot located in Kanab, Kane County, State of 
Utah, or particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest 
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" of the official 
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East 6.0 
rods, then north 108.75°; thence West 6.0 rods; thence 
South 108.75° to the point of beginning. 
b. Two shares of stock in the Kanab irrigation Company; 
c. A travel trailer, 5th-wheel type, Teton brand, 1978 
model; 
d. A travel trailer, 18 feet long, Kit Companion brand; 
e. A 1977 Chevrolet pickup truck; 
f. A 1980 Oldsmobile automobile; 
g. $2 0,000.00 taken by defendants from Zions First 
National Bank, account no: 052-50552-6. Id. at f 2. 
The trial court incorrectly concluded that the foregoing 
should be returned immediately to Grayce for two distinct 
reasons. First, the facts in this case would at best state that 
it was Mr. Hurd's intention to create a life estate with respect 
to the home for the benefit of Grayce with the remainder of the 
property to be owned and held by the defendants. Second, Grayce 
could not immediately take possession because any reconveyance 
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places Grayce and Mr. Sherman in their respective positions, 
which is as tenants in common. 
1. The Creation of a Life Estate 
Mr. Eddington testified that part of the consideration for 
executing the Power of Attorney in favor of Mr. Sherman was 
because Mr. Hurd wanted to see that Grayce was taken care of. 
Id. at 365. 
Plaintiff testified as follows: 
* * * 
Q. Are you sure it was a quit-claim deed? 
A. To give Lewellyn the power of attorney. 
Q. I See. Now, after that telephone call, was there some 
discussions before the attorney came that you recall? 
A. We just talked about the same thing and everybody 
agreed on it. And Lloyd asked me if I would go along 
with it, and I said, "Lloyd, if that's what you want, 
why, we would trust him with that." 
Q. Now, did you talk to Lewellyn about what was to be done 
with the property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who said what to Lewellyn or Connie? 
A. Lloyd also talked to Lewellyn about it, and he said, I 
want to know that Grayce will be taken care of. 
Q. And did Lewellyn or Connie respond when he said that? 
A. Lewellyn did. He said, I'll see she's taken care of. 
* * * 
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R-291 (emphasis provided). 
The foregoing testimony, the defendants assert, demonstrate 
at best that it was Mr. Hurd's intention to create a life estate 
in the real property for the benefit of Grayce. Therefore, the 
property would not be returned to Grayce but she would be allowed 
to live at the home during her lifetime. 
2. The Severance of the Joint Tenancy 
"When a joint tenant makes 'a bona fide conveyance of his 
interest in property to a third party, . . . this has the effect 
of terminating the joint tenancy, and converting the ownership 
into a tenancy in common." Crowther v. Mower. 876 P.2d 876, 878 
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting Nelson v. Davis, 592 P.2d 594, 596 
(Utah 1979)) (other citations omitted) (ellipsis in original). 
Grayce and Mr. Sherman signed a quitclaim deed regarding the 
real property, which said deed was recorded on June 2, 1992. See 
Addendum B f 22, also plaintiffs' Exhibit no. 21. Mr. Sherman 
signed the quitclaim deed as the attorney-in-fact. Id. Grayce 
signed the quitclaim after she and Mr. Hurd discussed signing the 
quitclaim deed, and then mutually agreed she sign. R-318. The 
grantors were Mr. Hurd and Grayce Hurd, husband and wife, and the 
grantees were Mr. Sherman and Ms. Sherman, as joint tenants with 
full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common. Id. 
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When Mr. Sherman signed the quitclaim deed, as Mr. Hurd, 
which was Mr. Hurd's instruction to Mr. Sherman, (R-415), that 
had the effect of conveying Mr. Hurd's interest in the real 
property to Mr. Sherman, and the joint tenancy was severed. 
Whether or not Grayce consented to it is immaterial. "'[E]ither 
party to a joint tenancy may terminate it . . . and . . . the 
consent of the other tenants to the severance or termination is 
not required." Id. (quoting 48A C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 16 at 343 
(1981) (citing Nelson, 592 P.2d at 596-97 and Clearfield State 
Bank v. Contos, 562 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1977)). The real 
property did not need to be returned because the joint tenancy 
has been severed. Also, because Grayce conveyed her interest to 
Mr. Sherman, Mr. Sherman owns the whole of the property. 
E. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH PLAINTIFFS' 
CLAIMS 
Plaintiffs' Complaint (R-9-5) does not specifically set 
forth causes of actions against the defendants. A reading of the 
Complaint, however, shows the plaintiffs alleged a cause of 
action based on fraud. 
1. Evidence Supporting Plaintiffs' Claim of Confidential 
Advisors 
With respect to the plaintiffs' claim regarding 
"confidential advisors," that claim may relate to the imposition 
of a constructive trust because a finding of a confidential 
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relationship is a prerequisite to the imposition of a 
constructive trust. See Ashton, 733 P.2d at 151 ("The transferee 
at the time of the transfer was in a confidential relationship to 
the transferor") (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45(b) 
(1957)). This issue has already been discussed by the defendants 
in subsection B. The plaintiffs did not prove the existence of a 
confidential relationship (confidential advisors) by clear and 
convincing evidence. Because the plaintiffs failed to prove the 
existence of a confidential relationship, a requisite to a 
constructive trust, the evidence does not support plaintiffs' 
claim of constructive trust. 
2. Evidence Supporting Plaintiffs' Claim of Fraud 
Under Utah law, to bring a claim sounding in 
fraud, a party must allege (1) that a representation 
was made (2) concerning a presently existing material 
fact (3) which was false and (4) which the 
representator either (a) knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing there was insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base such representation, (5) for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it 
(8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's 
injury and damage. 
Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066-67 
(Utah 1996) (citations omitted). "A misrepresentation of 
intended future performance is not a 'presently existing fact' 
upon which a claim of fraud can be based unless a plaintiff can 
prove that the representator, at the time of the representation, 
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did not intend to perform and made the representation for the 
purpose of deceiving the promisee." Andalex Resources, Inc. v. 
Mvers, 891 P. 2d 1041, 1046 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Applied 
Genetics, Int's, Inc. v. First Affiliated Securities, Inc., 912 
F.2d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1990)). "Fraud claims must be proven 
by clear and convincing evidence." Id. 
Defendants assert that plaintiffs' cause of action sounding 
in fraud must also fail because the plaintiff did not plead the 
enumerated factors set forth in Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil 
Co., 915 P.2d at 1066-67, then prove those factors by clear and 
convincing evidence, Andalex Resources, Inc., 891 P.2d at 1046. 
Not only did the plaintiffs not plead and prove the essential 
elements of fraud, the trial court did not find fraud. See 
Addendum B. The reason for this is because the evidence does not 
support a claim sounding in fraud. The plaintiffs did, however, 
alleged certain terms which could be attributable to a claim 
sounding in fraud. Because the plaintiffs did use certain terms, 
as to a claim sounding in fraud, the defendants will analyze 
those certain representations which the plaintiffs alleged were 
"false and fraudulent." PL's Compl. at ffl 10, 11. R-9-5. 
a. a representation was made 
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants represented that 
"the transfers must be made . . . in order to avoid probate and 
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inheritance problems which would result because of the impending 
death of Lloyd H. Hurd[.]" Pl-'s Compl. J 10. The plaintiffs 
also allege that the defendants represented "that there was an 
additional need to avoid creditors which made it urgent that all 
of the plaintiffs' property be transferred to defendants where it 
would be held in safekeeping for their benefit." Id. at f 11. 
With respect to representation concerning transfers to avoid 
probate and inheritance problems, plaintiffs' own testimony 
refutes this allegation. On direct examination, plaintiff 
testified as follows: 
* * * 
Q. Okay. And then what was said and who said it, do you 
remember? 
A. In the discussion? 
Q. Yes. 
A. That we had to get something done with the property 
and— 
Q. Who said that? 
A. And all our things that was, everything, the vehicles 
and everything was in both of our names had to be 
transferred out of our names because if we put Lloyd in 
the rest home, they would—the State would take 
everything. 
* * * 
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R-288 (emphasis provided). (Note: defendants objected to this 
response on grounds of 'not being responsive' which was sustained 
by the court.) 
Additional testimony from the plaintiff consisted of the 
following: 
* * * 
Q. Now did you discuss the need for transferring the 
property on the trip down? 
A. Oh, I think there was something said, yes. 
Q. Do you recall what was said? 
A. Well, that we have to get down to Kanab and get that 
taken care of. 
Q. Was there any other statements about why you had to 
take care of it? 
A. Yes. I was afraid I was going to lose my Social 
Security if it wasn't taken care of. 
Q. And who told you that? 
A. Lewellyn and Connie. 
* * * 
R-294 (emphasis provided). 
There was no testimony from the plaintiffs regarding an 
alleged representation that "the transfers must be made . . . in 
order to avoid probate and inheritance problems." Therefore, 
even if the plaintiffs allege that "the transfers must be made . 
. . in order to avoid probate and inheritance problems," the 
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plaintiffs failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that this representation was made. Because the plaintiffs failed 
to prove the existence of an alleged representation that "the 
transfers must be made . . . in order to avoid probate and 
inheritance problems," it is unnecessary to discuss the other 
factors and, accordingly, plaintiffs' claim of fraud based upon 
this alleged representation must fail. , 
I 
The plaintiffs also allege that the defendants represented 
"that there was an additional need to avoid creditors which made 
it urgent that all of the plaintiffs' property be transferred to 
defendants where it would be held in safekeeping for their 
benefit." PL's Compl. 5 11. The foregoing testimony from the 
plaintiffs also show that, although the plaintiffs allege there 
was a representation there was a need to transfer to avoid 
creditors, the plaintiffs, again, fail to prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that this representation was made. Because 
the plaintiffs fail to prove this alleged representation, it is 
unnecessary to discuss the other factors and, hence, plaintiffs7 
claim of fraud based upon this alleged representation must fail. 
In sum, because the plaintiffs failed to prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, the existence of a confidential 
relationship, that claim must fail. Similarly, because the 
plaintiffs fail to plead the essential elements of a claim 
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sounding in fraud, then prove these elements by clear and 
convincing evidence, plaintiffs7 claim of fraud must also fail. 
Thus, the evidence was insufficient to prove plaintiffs' claims. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Because Grayce is not a real party in interest based upon 
her claim of surviving spouse of Mr. Hurd, she cannot bring and 
maintain a cause of action against the defendants in the capacity 
of Personal Representative of the Estate of Lloyd H. Hurd. In 
fact, no person can bring and maintain a cause of action against 
the defendants in behalf of the Estate because no person 
satisfies the enumerated factors. 
Additionally, because the trial court did not find, by clear 
and convincing proof, the existence of either a confidential 
relationship and an oral promise to hold property, the trial 
court erred when it imposed a constructive trust on the conveyed 
real property, the transfer of funds, and the transfer of 
personal property. 
The trial court also erred when it found there was no 
consideration for the transfer of the real property, checks and 
vehicle titles. This is because, as previously demonstrated, 
either no consideration was necessary or there was sufficient 
consideration. 
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The trial court also erred when it concluded that all of the 
property be immediately returned to the plaintiffs because 
Grayce's claim at best would have been to create a life estate in 
one-half of the real property because she voluntarily transferred 
her own interest to Mr. Sherman, and because the transfer of the 
properties severed the joint tenancy. 
Finally, the evidence does not support plaintiffs' claims of 
constructive trust and fraud. With respect to plaintiffs' 
constructive trust claim, no confidential relationship existed 
and, moreover, the evidence would not support such a finding. 
Without this finding, plaintiffs' claim must fail. Regarding 
plaintiffs' claim of fraud, plaintiffs did not, by clear and 
convincing evidence, prove the essential elements of fraud and, 
therefore, this claim must also fail. Therefore, there was 
insufficient evidence to support plaintiffs' claims. A 
constructive trust was never requested by plaintiffs and fraud 
was never established. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day^qf June, 1997. 
A 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Tex R. Olsen 
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Attorney for Appellees 
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ADDENDUM A 
TEX R. OLSEN No. 2467 
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN r'^ ni 
225 NORTH 100 EAST, P.O. BOX 100 _ _ 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 ;-• ^7::Tnr;:—--. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
TELEPHONE: 896-4461 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
GRAYCE HURD 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LLEWELLYN J. SHERMAN and CONNIE 
SHERMAN, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
DECREE, JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER 
Civil No. 940600001 
Judge: David L. Mower 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before 
the Honorable David L. Mower, District Judge, city of Kanab, Utah 
on 4th day of April, 1996. Plaintiff appeared in person with her 
counsel, Tex R. Olsen of Richfield, Utah and the Defendants 
appeared in person their counsel Randy S. Ludlow, 311 South State 
#280 Salt Lake City, Utah and the court having heard various 
witnesses testifying or the parties and having examined evidence 
received and the court having made its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law does now Decree an Order: 
1. The constructive trust created by the parties is hereby 
terminated and the items transferred to the Defendants or either of 
them as constructive trustees shall be delivered to Plaintiff 
within a period of 10 days from the date of this Order. In 
addition to delivery of the items said forth, in this order, 
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Defendants shall execute such assignments and conveyances as are 
necessary to transfer title thereof to Plaintiff, Grayce Hurd: 
a. Defendant's shall deed and convey unincumbered title 
to the home located in Kanab, Kane County, Utah and particularly 
described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest 
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" of the official 
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East 6.0 
rods; thence North 108.75'; thence West 6.0 rods; thence 
South 108.75' to the point of beginning. 
Together with 2 shares of stock in the Kanab Irrigation Company. 
b. travel trailer, 5th-wheel type, Teton Brand, 1978 
model 
c. A house trailer, 18 foot ling, Kit companion brand; 
d. 1977 Chevrolet pickup truck 
e. 1980 Oldsmobile Automobile If the Oldsmobile is in 
the possession of Plaintiff the Defendants shall execute 
such assignments as are necessary to clear title of the 
property in Plaintiff. 
2. Further Plaintiff, is granted judgment against the 
Defendants, and each of them in the sum of $2 0,0 00 and costs. 
DATED this eh t day of September ,/£996 ., 
c_ )ISTRICT JUDGE 
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TEX R. OLSEN No. 2467 
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN 
225 NORTH 100 EAST, P.O. BOX 100 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
TELEPHONE: 896-4461 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
GRAYCE HURD 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LLEWELLYN J. SHERMAN and CONNIE 
SHERMAN, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. 940600001 
Judge: David L. Mower 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before 
the Honorable David L. Mower, District Judge, city of Kanab, Utah 
on April 4, 1996. Plaintiff was present with her attorney, Tex R. 
Olsen of Richfield, Utah and the Defendants were present with their 
attorney Randy S. Ludlow, 311 South State #280, Salt Lake City, 
Utah and the court having heard the witnesses who testified and 
having examined the various items of evidence entered and being 
fully advised and having considered objections of Defendant does 
now make the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties to this action are individuals. Their names 
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are Grayce Hurd, Llewellyn J. Sherman and Connie Sherman. Grayce 
was born on July 26, 1914. She lives at 123 East 100 North, Kanab, 
Utah. Llewellyn lives in West Valley City, Utah. 
2. Grayce Hurd is the mother of four living children, 2 
boys, Paul and Llewellyn, and 2 girls, Iris and Dorothy. All are 
adults. Their father was Rupert Sherman. The son Llewellyn is the 
same person as Defendant Llewellyn J. Sherman. 
3. Defendants Llewellyn and Connie were married together, 
but are now divorced. 
4. Grayce Hurd is currently acting as the personal 
representative of the Estate of Lloyd I. Hurd, deceased. The 
estate is being probated in this Court. 
5. Lloyd died on June 3, 1992. He was a veteran of the 
U.S. Military Forces. 
6. Lloyd and Grayce lived together since 1964, but never 
entered into formal marriage contract. They never had any 
children. 
Lloyd and Grayce did the following while living 7. 
together: 
a. Lived in several different cities and acquired both 
real and personal property over the years; 
b. Filed tax returns with the IRS and the State of 
Utah for the calendar year 1986; the filing status on 
the returns show "married, filing jointly;" y 
\ 
c. On June 10, 1985, they received a warranty deed 
from Georgia Phelps in which the grantees are "Lloyd I. 
Hurd and Grayce Hurd, his wife,...;" 
d. On July 10, 1985 they purchased title insurance in 
the names of "Lloyd I. Hurd and Grayce Hurd, his 
wife...;" 
e. In June and July of 1986 they maintained a joint 
checking account with Zions First National Bank, Kanab 
Office. 
f. From 1984 to 1986 they maintained a joint checking 
account with Valley Bank and Trust, Granger-Hunter 
Office. The account was in the names of Mr. Lloyd Hurd 
or Mrs. Lloyd Hurd.. 
8. In 1992 Lloyd became ill with cancer. 
9. On June 1, 1992, Lloyd and Grayce owned the following 
items of property: 
a. A house and lot located in Kanab, Kane County, 
State of Utah, more particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest 
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" of the official 
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East 
6.0 rods, thence north 108.75'; thence West 6.0 
rods; thence South 108.75' to the point of 
beginning. 
b. Two shares of stock in the Kanab Irrigation 
Company. 
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c. a travel trailer, fifth-heel type, Teton brand, 
1978 model; 
d. A travel trailer, 18 feet long, Kit Companion 
brand; 
e. a 1977 Chevrolet pickup truck; 
f. A 1980 Oldsmobile automobile; 
g. A bank account a Zions First National Bank, Kanab 
Branch, account number 052-50552-6, worth $20,420.85; 
h. A bank account at Zions First National Bank, Kanab 
Branch, account number 052-33638-5, worth $789.65. 
10. On May 4, 1992, Grayce took Lloyd to Veterans 
Administration Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah for treatment. He 
had cancer and was dying. Grayce stayed at Llewellyn's for a 
couple of days and then returned to kanab. 
11. kenneth Lamb of West Jordan, Utah, who is Lloyd's 
cousin, visited him in the hospital, Lloyd said, "Llewellyn is the 
only one I trust." 
12. On May 14, 1992, Lloyd left the V.A. Hospital and went 
to Llewellyn's home. Grayce had come from Kanab and was there with 
them. 
13. Kenneth Lamb and his wife, Deon, visited. there was a 
conversation about Lloyd's need for care. Kenneth mentioned the 
name of a rest home. Connie called a relative who worked at 
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another rest home. Part of the conversation had to do with 
protecting Lloyd and Grayce's property from being dissipated to pay 
or long-term care. 
14. On about May 15, 1992 iris, Llewellyn and another 
family member went to the office of Mr. Keith E. Eddington, an 
attorney. The topics of gift taxes and transfer of documents were 
discussed. 
15. On about May 20, 1992 Connie went to a document 
supplier or perhaps, an office supply store, and purchased a fill-
in- the -blank power of attorney form and took it to Mr. Eddington 
who filled in the blanks. 
16. On Friday, May 29, 1992 Lloyd, Grayce, Llewellyn and 
Connie met in Llewellyn's home and had a conversation. The 
conversation probably went something like this: 
Grayce: Lloyd, you're very ill. We should have you live 
someplace where you can get proper care, like a care center 
or a rest home. 
Lloyd: The only rest home where I would ever go is the same 
one where my sister Ruth is. 
Connie: (makes a phone call to the rest home where Ruth is 
and then reports:) There is no room there, and besides 
there is a waiting list to get in. My uncle works at the 
care center in Richfield, Utah. I'll call him and find out 
about their program. 
Lloyd: Who will pay for all this. Will Medicare pay? Will 
I lose my home to help pay for all these expenses? 
Connie: I just spoke with my uncle, Rodney Rasmussen, he 
says that Medicare will pay for rest home expenses, but they 
will want you to use up all our money and property first 
before they will pay anything. He also said something about 
setting aside transfers to defraud creditors. I didn't 
understand it all, but something about being able to cancel 
transactions that had taken place for up to 18 months before 
admission to the rest home. 
Lloyd: I don't want any of my property to go to the 
government. I want Grayce to have it. I'm just afraid that 
if she has it, Paul and Iris will try to take it from her 
and that she will allow them to do it. Llewellyn, why don't 
I give it all to you, then you can make sure that Grayce 
will be taken care of. Grace, is that ok with you? 
Grayce: It that's what you want, whatever you say. 
Lloyd: Grace and I have been together for almost 3 0 years, 
but we never did get married. Still, I think I should treat 
her as my wife. 
Grayce: What about social security, Lloyd. Will I be able 
to collect under your name, even though we never got 
married? 
Connie: That worries me. What if Mom collects social 
security under Dad's name and then the government discovers 
they weren't married. They'll want her to pay it back. If 
she's spent the money, then maybe the home would be in 
danger. 
Llewellyn: Let's do this: I'll keep all the property for a 
year. Mom can apply for social security. If nobody says 
anything for a year, then we should be safe and I'll give 
all the property back to her. In the meantime, she can 
continue living in the house. 
Lloyd: That sounds good to me, but I'm not dead yet. I 
want to go back home. 
Llewellyn; I know, I know. But, let's call that lawyer and 
get the power of attorney signed. Then if anything should 
happen to you then you and Mom will be protected. 
17. Mr. Eddingtom came, met with Lloyd, who signed the 
power of attorney. It was left with Llewellyn. Grayce paid Mr. 
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Eddington $50.00. 
18. Llewellyn made arrangements for Lloyd to stay with 
Kenneth and Deon Lamb. Lloyd went to their home on May 29, 1992. 
19. Llewellyn and Grayce left for Kanab on Saturday, May 
30, 1992. 
20. Lloyd took a turn for the worse on Tuesday, June 2, 
1992 while at the Lambs home. Mr. Lamb called someone and then 
took Lloyd back to the Veterans Administration hospital. 
21. On Tuesday, June 2, 1992, Llewellyn had blank checks 
for account 052-50552-6. He filled out two as follows: 
Check # Payee Amount Signature For 
101 Llewellyn Sherman $10,000.00 Lloyd I. Hurd Gift 
Llewellyn Sherman 
102 Connie Sherman $10,000.00 Lloyd I. Hurd Gift 
Llewellyn Sherman 
Llewellyn presented these checks for payment along with a copy of 
the power of attorney. They were at the bank until noon when they 
left without having negotiated the checks. 
22. They went to a title company. Grayce paid to have a 
quitclaim deed prepared. Grayce and Llewellyn signed the deed and 
offered it for recording at the County Recorder's office. It was 
recorded on June 2, 1992 at 2:55 p.m. at book 0120 page 777 of the 
official records of Kane County. Grayce paid the recording fee. 
The grantors in the deed are "Lloyd I. Hurd and Grayce Hurd, 
husband and wife." The grantees in the deed are "Llewellyn J. 
Sherman and Connie Sherman, husband and wife, as joint tenants with 
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full rights of survivorship, and not as tenants in common." 
Llewellyn signed the deed for Lloyd as his attorney in fact. 
23. They went to the State Tax Commission office in Kanab 
where Grayce signed the titles to the 1977 Chevrolet pickup, the 
5th wheel and the 18-foot travel trailers. The titles were 
transferred. Grayce paid all the transfer fees. 
24. They returned to the bank. Llewellyn opened an account 
there in the name of him and Connie. A bank officer agreed to 
negotiate the checks and deposit them into this new account. 
25. Neither Llewellyn nor Connie paid money nor transferred 
anything of value to Grayce in exchange or the quitclaim deed, the 
checks or the vehicle titles. 
26. Lloyd died on June 3, 1992 
27. On June 5, 1992 the Salt Lake City - County Health 
Department issued a Certificate of Death for Lloyd. The 
information listed therein is "Wife - Grayce N. Hurd \ 123 East 100 
North Street #61 \ Kanab, Utah 84741." 
28. Lloyd's funeral was held on June 8, 1992 in Kanab. 
After the services, Llewellyn and Grayce had a conversation. He 
said, "Let's wait a year and see what happens with Social Security. 
Then I'll give all the property back to you." 
29. Llewellyn paid Lloyd's funeral and burial expenses and 
has purchases headstones or both Lloyd and Grace. There was no 
evidence given at trial concerning values. 
30. In July of 1993, Llewellyn bought some materials and 
helped install them on the roof of the home in Kanab. There was no 
evidence given at trial concerning values. 
31. In the spring of 1993, Llewellyn transferred the title 
to the 1978 Teton 5th-wheel to Grayce. She has possession of it in 
Kanab. 
32. Connie testified that she claims no interest in the 
home and lot in Kanab. She said that she and Llewellyn were 
recently divorced in Salt Lake County and that the decree awards 
all of her interest in that property to him. 
33. More than one year has passed since Lloyd's death. 
34. No claims have been made by Social Security, Veterans' 
Administration nor any Medicare or long term care provider. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now 
enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. A constructive trust was created for the benefit of the 
Plaintiff. 
2. All of the property received in trust for the benefit of 
the Plaintiff should be immediately returned, assigned and 
transferred to Plaintiff including the following: 
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a. A house and lot located in Kanab, Kane County, Utah 
or particularly described as: 
Beginning at a point 6.0 rods East of the Southwest 
corner of Lot 2, Block 26, Plat "A" o the official 
survey of Kanab Townsite, and running thence East 
6.0 rods; thence North 108.75'; thence West 6.0 
rods; thence south 108.75' to the point of 
beginning. 
b. 2 shares of stock in the Kanab Irrigation Company. 
c. A house trailer, 5th-wheel type, Teton Brand, 1978 
model 
d. A travel trailer, 18 foot long, Kit Companion 
brand; 
e. 1977 Chevrolet pickup truck 
f. 1980 Oldsmobile Automobile 
g. $20,000.00 taken by Defendants from Zions First 
National Bank, account number 052-50552-6; 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendants 
in the sum of $20,000.00 together with costs of court incurred. 
DATED this day of September, 1996. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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